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Most studies of electoral behaviour in New Zealand do not pay much attention to the 
religious-secular cleavage. While a few studies noted a religious-secular cleavage prior to the 
adoption of proportional representation, most have assumed that such a divide since 1996 has 
been confined to the margins of electoral politics, with religious voters supporting smaller 
third parties over National. This article re-evaluates this conclusion using data from the New 
Zealand Election Study since 1990. The analyses show that, rather than supporting small 
third parties more clearly representing issues of concern to them, religious voters have voted 
largely for National in most elections as part of a religious-secular cleavage between National 
and Labour. Fluctuation in support for National among religious voters is tied to National’s 
electoral fortunes: religious voters have been more likely to support National when the party 
has been likely to form the next government, but more likely to cast votes for third parties 






As identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in their magisterial study of party system 
development, one major social cleavage that divides the electorates of several countries is the 
cleavage between religious and secular. Although other cleavages have declined in 
significance over the last several decades since the publication of their seminal study 
(Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992), the divide between religious and secular remains 
significant in many countries despite considerable secularisation (Elff 2007; Minkenberg 
2010). Though rarely emphasised relative to the impact of other social cleavages, some 
previous research from prior to the adoption of mixed-member proportional representation 
(MMP) found evidence of a religious-secular cleavage in New Zealand between the more 
religiously inclined National Party and the more secular Labour Party (Levine and Robinson 
1976; Bean 1988, 1992; Minkenberg 2010). 
Since the adoption of MMP, however, the consensus view is that religious differences 
are largely irrelevant for electoral politics, affecting only support for third parties on the 
margins of New Zealand politics (Boston 1994, 74; Barker and McLeay 2000, 145-147). 
Because third parties explicitly representing the social conservatism of religious voters 
compete with National for religious voters’ support (while religious-secular issues have not 
been the primary foci of the two largest parties), and because MMP provides more incentives 
for religious voters to support third parties than was the case under first-past-the-post, 
religious voters may have shifted their support to third parties representing socially 
conservative issues explicitly.  As a result, the religious-secular cleavage between National 
and Labour in elections seen in earlier elections is argued to have disappeared in elections 
held under MMP.   
In contrast to previous research, I argue that the religious-secular cleavage remains an 
independent cleavage in New Zealand electoral politics that divides National and Labour 
voters.  Moreover, I argue that this is due to the fact that the bulk of religious voters’ support 
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in most elections has gone to National.  While many religious voters tried supporting socially 
conservative third parties immediately after MMP was adopted, they reverted to supporting 
National because these third parties failed to deliver many seats and offered even less 
influence over policy than is offered when supporting National.  This reversion back to 
National has occurred because National remains the most likely right-of-centre party to form 
a government (more so today than between 1993 and 2002).  
In the next section, I review the existing evidence—both the literature suggesting a 
religious-secular cleavage exists and the literature suggesting it does not—in greater detail.  
Following that, I conduct two sets of analyses.  The first examines the impact of religious-
secular differences on voting behaviour between National and Labour in recent elections; the 
second examines the degree to which religious voters’ support has gone to National (as it did 
in the past) relative to third-party alternatives.  A final section concludes with a discussion 
regarding the need to revisit the importance of the religious-secular cleavage in New Zealand 
politics.   
Theoretical Background 
When discussing the social bases of electoral politics in New Zealand, previous 
research identifies several relevant social cleavages.i The most obvious are class issues, 
which have constituted the main division between Labour and National since the 1930s 
(Alford 1963; Robinson 1967; Bean 1988). A second is an ethnic cleavage whereby Māori 
and Pacific Islander voters overwhelmingly support Labour whilst National draw largely 
from voters of European descent (Aimer and Vowles 2004; Iusitini and Crothers 2013). In 
addition to these cleavages, other research finds evidence of an urban-rural cleavage (Honey 
and Barnett 1990), a gender gap (Coffé 2013), and differences in voting behaviour among 
religious denominations.ii 
One cleavage that has received relatively little attention is the religious-secular 
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cleavage.iii Those few studies examining this religious-secular cleavage find that religious 
voters favour National—due to the social conservatism of religious voters relative to secular 
votersiv—whilst secular voters prefer Labour (Levine and Robinson 1976, 317-319; Bean 
1988; Minkenberg 2010). Though these findings have received only scant attention, in part 
due to the greater strength of other cleavage-based explanations, these previous studies 
suggest that a religious-secular cleavage in voting behaviour was present throughout much of 
the twentieth century.   
However, the fact that most studies examining the religious-secular cleavage are 
confined to the period prior to the adoption of MMP leaves open the question whether a 
religious-secular cleavage persists into the present day.  Since the adoption of MMP, most 
studies examining New Zealand party politics have either declared religious issues to be of 
minor consequence for electoral politics (at least for party choice between National and 
Labour) (Vowles 1998a, 66-67; Barker and McLeay 2000, 145-147) or ignored religious-
secular issues altogether (Boston 1994, 74; Fairburn and Haslett 2005, 530). Further evidence 
that the religious-secular cleavage has been marginalised is the fact that the main parties say 
very little about issues dealing with religious-secular themes: one is hard-pressed, for 
instance, to find issues pertaining in a meaningful way to religion in the major parties’ recent 
manifestos.   
The reason many believe the religious-secular cleavage, to the extent that it divided 
National and Labour voters in the past, has disappeared is because MMP provides incentives 
for the two largest parties not to represent religious/secular issues.  Because National and 
Labour are rooted primarily in class and ethnic cleavages, these parties have an incentive to 
avoid issues of morality, which may divide the parties internally and in turn distract from the 
parties’ primary agendas—as has been the case with parties in other Westminster systems 
(Smith and Tatalovich 2003). Moreover, because MMP produces seat shares that are more 
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proportional to parties’ vote shares, third parties representing specific issues that the two 
largest parties do not fully address are more likely to attract enough support to win 
representation than they would under the first-past-the-post system.  Given this, one might 
expect that any religious-secular cleavage observed between National and Labour prior to the 
adoption of MMP would have evaporated, as these two parties concentrate on issues related 
to their ethnic and class-based differences and leave religious-secular issues to be represented 
by third parties.  The early success of the Christian Coalition shortly after the adoption of 
MMP suggests as much.  As a result, previous research argues that a religious-secular 
cleavage—if such a divide exists—remains confined to the fringes of politics, failing to 
impact support for the two main parties.   
Despite these arguments, there are reasons to believe that a religious-secular cleavage 
persists.  Were the base of religious voters to decline in size, this would suggest that the 
impact of religious voters on support for National has declined, as variation in the impact of 
social cleavages on party support depends in part on the size of groups (Lachat 2007; Best 
2011). While there certainly has been considerable secularisation of society over the past 
several decades (Hoverd 2008; Vaccarino, Kavan, and Gendall 2011), religion has not gone 
away and there is still a fairly steady base of religious voters.  Among those who remain 
religiously committed, issues of traditional morality may still matter at the ballot box.  If 
anything, the fact that societal development and the secularisation of society lead to more 
socially conservative religious voters suggests religious voters today will be even more likely 
to support right-leaning parties than in the past (Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel 2013). 
The persistence of religious voters as a small, but non-trivial constituency can be seen 
in Figure 1, which displays the proportion of voters in each election attending religious 
services at least once per month between 1990 and 2014 using data from the New Zealand 
Election Studies.  Figure 1 shows that the proportion of voters attending religious services at 
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least once a month in 2014 was roughly similar to that proportion observed in 1990: despite 
societal secularisation, roughly 20 percent of the voting population remains religiously 
observant.  Thus, the pool of religious voters who could potentially support National remains 
nearly as deep as was the case in elections prior to the adoption of MMP.  As a result, if the 
religious-secular cleavage has disappeared, this was not due to a lack of religious voters.   
On a more fundamental level, one would expect the religious-secular cleavage to 
persist because issues of concern to religious voters continue to divide society in New 
Zealand, and thus should continue to play at least some independent role in electoral politics.  
While they rarely feature prominently in political campaigns, important social issues like 
abortion, same-sex civil unions/marriage, LGBTQ rights, divorce, prostitution, and 
euthanasia (to name a few) have emerged as major political issues since the adoption of 
MMP (“Prostitution decriminalised.” 2003; “MPs vote 65-55.” 2004; Ahdar 2006; Rishworth 
2007; Findlay 2011). As was the case prior to the adoption of MMP, these issues have been 
decided as free votes (Lindsey 2010). Though many National Members of Parliament (MPs) 
supported the socially conservative positions on votes deciding these issues, National’s 
caucus has become more socially liberal in recent years, as exemplified by the bill legalising 
same-sex marriage on which National MPs split almost evenly between supporters and 
opponents.  The lack of clear party positions in favour of the socially conservative values 
held by many religious voters created an opening for several third parties taking much more 
socially conservative stances to represent these issues in the hopes that they might be 
rewarded by voters, who are more likely to support them under MMP than was the case prior 
to 1996.  Thus, while the continued presence of political issues of concern to socially 
conservative religious voters provides evidence that a religious-secular cleavage persists, the 
presence of third parties explicitly representing socially conservative positions suggests that 
many religious voters may have shifted their support to these parties.   
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While a religious-secular cleavage could support the development of third parties 
under MMP that are focused primarily on representing issues of concern to socially 
conservative religious voters, there is reason to believe that many religious voters will 
continue to concentrate their support primarily on National as long as National’s chances of 
forming the government are strong.  Despite the use of MMP and the availability of socially 
conservative third parties, electoral politics in New Zealand remain strongly rooted in the 
two-party dualism of the pre-1996 party system.  While a handful of religiously-oriented 
parties capable of representing religious issues have emerged since the adoption of MMP, 
none have been particularly successful or have survived over several elections.   
The lack of long-term viability for these socially conservative parties is predicted by 
previous research suggesting that religious groups constituting less than a majority will seek 
to preserve resources and enhance their political power by working with large parties that 
have the best chance of implementing policy instead of third parties catering to particular 
groups of religious voters.v Because religious voters constitute a small share of the electorate, 
third parties appealing exclusively to socially conservative religious voters have virtually no 
chance of attracting enough votes to put such parties in contention to form the government.  
Given the effects of other social cleavages like class, ethnicity, and urban-rural residence 
noted above that likely undermine the cohesiveness of religious voters as a voting bloc, the 
exclusive appeals of these socially conservative parties even make it difficult for such parties 
to win enough votes to cross the five percent threshold to win parliamentary representation.  
Without representation, these parties cannot deliver on the policies their supporters demand.   
With these limitations in mind, and because National remain the only right-of-centre 
party that could plausibly form a government, many socially conservative religious voters 
may have come to view that they are better served by supporting National and pressuring 
their MPs to support their issue concerns than they are when supporting socially conservative 
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third parties.  While these religious voters might not have perceived a benefit to supporting 
National when the party had no chance of forming the government—as was the case in the 
1990s and early 2000s—they may be more likely to vote for National now that the party 
stands a good chance of leading the government and given that the socially conservative third 
parties they have supported in the past have failed to elect many seats.  By supporting 
National over third-party alternatives, socially conservative religious voters can put pressure 
on National MPs to represent their positions on votes dealing with issues of morality.  Even if 
this tactic is not always successful (e.g. marriage rights were extended to same-sex couples 
under a National government), socially conservative religious voters are at least able to lobby 
a larger number of potentially sympathetic MPs when they support National; such lobbying 
was not possible when they supported third parties without parliamentary representation.vi 
We can see some evidence in favour of this argument when looking at the history of 
socially conservative third parties under MMP.  Immediately after MMP was introduced (and 
when the impact of one’s voting behaviour were hard to gauge due to National’s weak 
position in the polls - Vowles 1998a, 72, 1998b, 34-35), many religious voters followed the 
cues of those like Graeme Lee, who left National because he and they thought the party was 
insufficiently conservative, and supported the Christian Coalition.  Although the Christian 
Coalition failed to breach the five percent threshold in 1996 and the coalition split back into 
separate parties, these religious voters faced few incentives to switch their support back to 
National in 1999 as National’s declining support decreased its chances of forming a 
government.  Because National fared even worse in 2002 than it did in 1999, religious voters 
supporting the successor to Lee’s Christian Democrats followed the cues of Future New 
Zealand party members when they merged with United to form United First New Zealand.  
While United Future won nearly seven percent of the vote and eight MPs in 2002, internal 
party squabbles would drive many religious voters away from the party, resulting in the 
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downward trend in United Future’s support that has been evident since 2005.  Although the 
Conservative Party—formed by many of the Future New Zealand members who quit United 
Future—continues to contest elections, the Conservatives have also failed to attract sufficient 
support to cross the five percent threshold.  Thus, socially conservative parties have proved to 
be weak contenders under MMP.   
After several socially conservative parties failed to attract many votes and/or exert 
much political influence, many religious voters may have come to perceive that their votes 
would be more effective if they voted National.  These religious voters may have been 
tempted to support National as the party’s prospects of forming the government started to 
improve in 2005, a process that was likely accelerated in elections since 2008 when National 
went on to form three governments.  While National’s positions are less clearly conservative 
than the third parties mentioned above, supporting National at least allows these religious 
voters the chance to lobby MPs they had a part in electing to represent their values on votes 
in Parliament deciding issues of morality.   
In sum, there is reason to believe that the religious-secular cleavage seen in elections 
prior to the adoption of MMP (Levine and Robinson 1976; Bean 1988, 317-319, 1992; 
Minkenberg 2010) has persisted in recent elections.  Despite the use of MMP and the 
presence of parties adopting socially conservative positions, socially conservative religious 
voters have incentives to support National over socially conservative third parties—
particularly when National is in contention to form the government.  The remainder of this 
article examines whether the evidence bears out these claims.   
Research Design 
To determine whether a religious-secular cleavage between National and Labour 
exists in the contemporary party system—and if so, how durable this cleavage is—I examine 
data from the New Zealand Election Surveys (NZES) between 1990 and 2014.  These dates 
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cover the entire period under MMP.  This allows me to examine voting behaviour before and 
after the adoption of MMP in order to determine whether the incentives for greater party 
system fragmentation under MMP have resulted in a weakening of any religious-secular 
cleavage, or whether a religious-secular cleavage between National and Labour remains 
salient despite MMP.   
The analysis proceeds in two steps.  First, I examine voting behaviour using a 
dependent variable that is coded one for National and zero for Labour.  Because the 
discussion above suggests religious-secular differences divide voters primarily along 
National-Labour lines, I initially focus primarily on voting for these two parties.  These 
analyses use binary logistic regression to estimate National/Labour support.  To determine 
whether the religious-secular manifests itself primarily as a divide between National and 
Labour or whether most religious voters have shifted their support to more socially 
conservative third parties, the second step in the analysis examines the degree to which 
religious voters support National relative to other alternatives.  This second analysis includes 
all parties in each survey supported by more than 30 respondents to ensure sufficient numbers 
of observations for multinomial logistic regression models to converge with reliable 
estimates.  With the exceptions of 1990 and 1993 (in which voters cast only one ballot), I 
examine voting behaviour on the party ballot because this ballot more clearly represents 
respondents’ sincere party preferences under MMP rules (as opposed to the electorate vote, 
which may be conditioned by tactical voting concerns).  As a result of examining the party 
ballot, the chances of finding evidence of a religious-secular cleavage between National and 
Labour are reduced due to the greater incentives for socially conservative religious voters to 
support third parties on the party ballot.vii 
To measure religious-secular differences, I divide respondents according to 
respondents’ frequency of attendance at religious services—which is one of the standard 
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measures used in previous research (Elff 2007; Minkenberg 2010). I code respondents 
attending religious services once a month or more as one and those attending less frequently 
as zero.viii I use this coding scheme rather than the entire range of the scale due to differences 
in measurement between the 1990 and 1993 NZES and subsequent NZES surveys: whereas 
the 1990 and 1993 NZES uses five categories (once a week, two-three times per month, 
several times per year, less than several times per year, and never), subsequent NZES waves 
included a sixth category for those attending once per month.ix That being said, using the full 
range of the scale produces results that are substantively equivalent to those presented here.   
In order to reduce the possibility that any relationship between attendance and vote 
choice is due to the impact of other social group-based effects that overlap with religious-
secular differences, I include several variables to control for the major alternative hypotheses.  
In addition to religious service attendance, I include a dummy variable (‘Traditional’) 
measuring voters belonging to religious denominations that have traditionally supported 
National (Anglicans, Presbyterians, Catholics, and Methodists) (See, e.g., Vowles 1998a, 66-
67). Because the effect of attendance may be redundant among voters belonging to these 
religious groups (i.e. religious voters belonging to each of the four denominations was 
already likely to vote for National irrespective of their religious commitment), I include a 
variable measuring the interaction between this variable and attendance.  To rule out the 
possibility that what appears to be a religious-secular cleavage may turn out to be spurious 
once accounting for the differences between voters belonging to ethnic minority groups and 
voters of European descent, I include a dummy variable in which voters of European descent 
are coded zero, and respondents of all other ethnicities are coded one.   
To rule out the impact of the class cleavage/socioeconomic differences, which are 
generally believed to be the most important social group forces structuring political choices 
in New Zealand, I include dummy variables measuring households with union members and 
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respondents holding university degrees, as well as a variable measuring household income.  
In 1990, the income variable ranges from zero to six (low to high income); in 1993 and 1996, 
this variable ranges from zero to eight; and from 1999 to 2011, this variable ranges from zero 
to seven.  Due to the high numbers of non-responses, I use mean substitution for missing 
values.  Additionally, I include dummy variables for respondents residing in rural areas (to 
control for the urban-rural divide), a dummy variable for female respondents to control for a 
possible gender gap, and respondents’ ages at the time of election.  In order to facilitate 
comparisons between the effect of attendance and the effects of each other variable, I 
standardise income and age by subtracting the mean from each variable and dividing each by 
twice the standard deviation; previous research shows this allows for comparisons between 
scale and dummy variables (Gelman 2008).  
The Religious-Secular Cleavage Between National and Labour 
Parameter estimates from each regression model estimating the impact of attendance 
on National/Labour voting behaviour appear in Table 1.  Prior to the adoption of MMP, high 
frequency of attendance was associated with a higher likelihood of voting for National, as 
indicated by the statistically significant coefficients for the variables measuring frequent 
attendance.  Following the adoption of MMP, the estimated effect of frequent attendance is 
reduced and becomes statistically insignificant between 1996 and 2002.  This effect becomes 
statistically significant again in 2005 and remains so through 2014.  Thus, the results show 
that there has been a religious-secular cleavage evident in most elections despite the adoption 
of MMP.   
The results show that the differences between religious and secular voters in most 
instances remain significant after controlling for alternative explanations.  Those belonging to 
the four denominations that have traditionally supported National are significantly more 
likely to vote for National (while the effect of attendance among these voters is tempered by 
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their denominational background, as implied by the negative coefficient for the interaction).  
The results also suggest that voters of non-European descent are significantly less likely to 
vote National than voters of European descent.  Although the coefficients for the attendance 
variable suggest the effects of the religious-secular cleavage in most elections are not as 
strong as the effects of other variables like income or union membership, the results suggest 
the impact of attendance is also independent of the effects of the other major cleavages.   
To visualise the impact of the religious-secular cleavage on voting behaviour, Figure 
2 presents the predicted probabilities of voting for National among frequently and 
infrequently-attending voters.  I generate these probabilities assuming voters do not belong to 
one of the religious denominations that traditionally have supported National (in order to 
focus on the effect of attendance as distinct from this denominational effect of religion) and 
holding all other variables to their median values.  With the exception of elections between 
1996 and 2002, Figure 2 shows that the majority of frequently-attending voters (after 
controlling for the other variables in the model) voted for National over Labour.  In the last 
several elections, the probabilities of frequently-attending voters supporting National over 
Labour are even greater than those observed in the two elections held prior to the adoption of 
MMP.  While the probabilities of infrequently-attending voters supporting National also 
increase substantially over the last several elections,x the fact remains that religious voters—
or at least those of European descent—continue to concentrate their support on National 
rather than Labour.  Moreover, while the predicted probabilities of voting for National among 
frequently-attending voters are not significantly different from infrequently-attending voters 
between 1996 and 2002, these probabilities are significantly different from one another 
between 2005 and 2014.   
Taken together, these conclusions suggest that the adoption of MMP has not 
eliminated the religious-secular cleavage between National and Labour.  While the cleavage 
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disappeared between 1996 and 2002, the majority of religious voters of European descent 
have supported National over Labour in recent elections much as they did prior to the 
adoption of MMP.  What remains to be seen is whether this small base of religious voters 
continues to concentrate its support on National to the same degree as prior to the adoption of 
MMP or whether the religious-secular cleavage has been transformed under MMP, with most 
religious voters transferring their support to socially conservative third parties instead of 
supporting National.   
Religious Voters and Support for Third-Party Alternatives 
To evaluate whether the religious-secular cleavage remains concentrated primarily on 
National and Labour or whether religious voters have switched to third parties more 
explicitly representing issues of concern to socially conservative religious voters, I re-
estimated each model in Table 1 by replacing the binary vote choice measure with a 
categorical measure including all parties in each election whose support could reliably be 
estimated using multinomial logistic regression.  For ease of interpretation, I omit parameter 
estimates and instead present the predicted probabilities of voting for each party among 
voters frequently attending religious services (holding all other variables at their median 
values) in Table 2.  To help the reader evaluate the argument that the degree to which 
religious voters support National over third-party alternatives depends in part on National’s 
chances of forming a government, I present National’s vote share in each election at the top 
of Table 2.  While National’s vote share is a problematic ex ante measure, it is a good proxy 
for the likelihood that National will form the government: because pre-election polls have 
predicted National’s final vote shares quite well (See, e.g., Levine and Roberts 1991, 1994; 
DigiPoll 2014),xi National’s vote shares reflect the fact that voters could anticipate whether 
National was a viable contender for government and adjust their behaviour accordingly. 
The predicted probabilities in Table 2—generated by holding other variables at their 
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medians—show a sharp disparity in the predicted probabilities of voting National during the 
period following the adoption of MMP.  On the one hand, religious voters in the three most 
recent elections—when limiting the definition of ‘religious voters’ to those of European 
descent—tend to support National over third-party alternatives.  In these elections, support 
among voters frequently attending religious services is as high as the levels of support 
observed in 1990 prior to the adoption of MMP and significantly greater than the predicted 
probabilities of voting for Labour.   
While at least a plurality of religious voters of European descent between 2005 and 
2014 support National over third-party alternatives to the same degree as 1990, National does 
not attract the plurality of these voters’ support between 1996 and 2002.xii  In these three 
elections, support for National among religious voters of European descent is lower than the 
support observed among Labour.  Although many religious voters in these three elections 
side with Labour, these religious voters also desert National for third parties more explicitly 
representing issues of concern to socially conservative religious voters.  This includes the 
Christian Coalition in 1996 (where the predicted probability of support among voters 
frequently attending religious services is 52 percent), Christian Heritage (with a predicted 
probability of 19 percent), and United Future (where the predicted probability is 43 percent).  
Even though National receives a plurality of the support of religious voters of European 
descent, the struggles faced by National could even be seen in 1993, when many religious 
voters deserted the party for the Alliance (which attracted many protest votes, but also several 
religious Māori voters attracted by the party’s focus on Māori rights) and New Zealand First 
(which has taken many socially conservative positions over the years).   
As argued above, this variation in the degree to which religious voters side with 
National over third-party alternatives can be explained in reference to the electoral viability 
of third parties and National’s chances of forming government.  It was when National was 
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likely to lose elections between 1993 and 2002—when the vote shares of National are 
lowest—that religious voters were most likely to follow the cues of conservative politicians 
like Graeme Lee and support third parties giving explicit voice to socially conservative issues 
instead of voting for National.  Similar to the party system in 1990, however, voters looking 
at opinion polls prior to the elections of 2005-2014 could see that National was most likely to 
win the election and form the government.  Because National was a viable contender to form 
the government, and because socially conservative third parties failed to attract much support 
between 1993 and 2002, many religious voters once again concentrated their support on 
National instead of these third parties.  As a result, the predicted probabilities in Table 2 show 
that a plurality or majority of high-frequency attenders supported National between 2005 and 
2014.   
Thus, despite the use of MMP, National continues to receive the bulk of the votes of 
religious voters of European descent in most elections despite the presence of socially 
conservative third parties.  Because socially conservative third parties have proved to be 
structurally limited in the degree to which they can attract voters and win seats, the results 
presented above suggest that many religious voters will continue to concentrate their support 
on National over socially conservative third parties as long as National remains a viable 
contender to form governments.  This, in turn, reinforces the conclusion reached above that a 
religious-secular cleavage focused to a large extent on the divide between National and 
Labour remains under MMP.   
Conclusion 
This paper has re-evaluated the presence and impact of the religious-secular cleavage 
on voting behaviour in elections to Parliament in New Zealand.  While a few studies 
conducted prior to the adoption of MMP found evidence of a religious-secular cleavage in 
New Zealand (Levine and Robinson 1976; Bean 1988, 317-319, 1992; Minkenberg 2010), 
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those studies conducted since the adoption of MMP have argued that religious issues and the 
small group of religious voters concerned with these issues have been relegated to the 
margins of third-party politics since the adoption of MMP.  This is because (1) issues of 
concern to religious voters rarely feature in discussions among the largest parties, (2) the 
largest parties usually avoid responsibility for these issues whenever they do arise by 
deciding these issues as conscience votes, and (3) MMP provides incentives for issues of 
concern to many religious voters to be represented by third parties focused more explicitly on 
these issues (whilst MMP provides incentives for religious voters to support these parties).  
In contrast to previous research, this paper argued that a religious-secular cleavage has 
resurfaced in recent elections.  The analysis performed here reached two conclusions.  First, 
the analysis showed that a religious-secular cleavage has been observable in most elections.  
Second, the analysis also showed that this cleavage remains focused to a considerable extent 
on the divide between National and Labour because the bulk of religious voters in recent 
elections—though confined to those of European descent—have concentrated their support 
on National rather than the third parties more explicitly representing socially conservative 
positions.   
Despite the availability of third parties more clearly representing socially conservative 
values, and despite the increased incentives under MMP (relative to first-past-the-post) for 
voters to support these third parties, the results presented here are consistent with the 
argument that many religious voters of European descent support National over third-party 
alternatives due to the weaker electoral and policy prospects of socially conservative third 
parties and the greater prospects (however marginal) these voters might be able to influence 
policy when supporting National.  When National’s prospects of forming the government 
were low (as was the case in the 1990s/early 2000s), many religious voters tried supporting 
third parties more clearly representing socially conservative positions to replace National.  
17 
 
Because these socially conservative third parties proved incapable of electing many MPs, 
many religious voters began to concentrate their support more on National than on third 
parties, particularly as National became more likely to form governments during the election 
of 2005.   
These results have implications for future research.  Although the religious-secular 
cleavage is but one determinant of voting behaviour these findings emphasise that ignoring 
religious-secular issues risks missing an important aspect of electoral competition for a small 
but non-trivial share of the electorate.  While continued secularisation may reduce the 
incentives for parties to represent the socially conservative side of moral issues, the findings 
presented here suggest that the religious-secular cleavage will continue to motivate the voting 
behaviour of parts of the electorate for year to come.   
Additionally, these results have implications for research on the representation of 
religious issues in proportional representation systems more generally.  While proportional 
representation provides incentives for party system fragmentation, religious voters will not 
automatically flock to parties explicitly representing their views.  Instead of supporting 
parties representing religious voters’ interests explicitly, religious voters may instead support 
their next most-preferred party if their preferred party remains hopeless under proportional 
representation—while their second most-preferred party has better prospects of shaping 
policy.   
Finally, while this paper has focused on the party vote, future research should also 
consider the impact of the religious-secular cleavage on the electorate vote more explicitly 
than was the case here.xiii  Because the electorate vote promotes constituency-focused (as 
opposed to nationally-focused) representation, we may observe that the effects of the 
religious-secular cleavage on voting behaviour are even stronger than the effects of the 
religious-secular cleavage on the party vote.  Such an analysis may help us to understand the 
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diversity of opinions within the parties’ caucuses in Parliament on social issues, with more 
socially conservative MPs voting against issues like marriage equality in electorates with 







Ahdar, Rex J. 2006. “Reflections on the Path of Religion-State Relations in New Zealand.” 
2006 BYU Law Review, Issue 3: 619-659. 
Aimer, Peter, and Jack Vowles. 2004. “What happened at the 2002 election.” In Voters’ veto: 
The 2002 election in New Zealand and the consolidation of minority government, edited by 
Jack Vowles, 16-32. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press.  
Alford, Robert R. 1963. Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies. Chicago: 
Rand McNally. 
Barker, Fiona, and Elizabeth McLeay. 2000. “How Much Change: An Analysis of the Initial 
Impact of Proportional Representation on the New Zealand Parliamentary Party System.” 
Party Politics 6(2): 131-154.   
Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: 
The Stability of European Electorates, 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bean, Clive. 1988. “Class and Party in the Anglo-American Democracies: The Case of New 
Zealand in Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science 18(3): 303-321. 
Bean, Clive. 1992. “New Zealand.” In Electoral change: Responses to evolving social and 
attitudinal structures in Western countries, edited by Mark Franklin, Tom Mackie, and Henry 
Valen, 284-306. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Best, Robin. 2011. “The declining electoral relevance of traditional cleavage 
groups.” European Political Science Review 3(02): 279-300.   
Boston, Jonathan. 1994. “Electoral Reform in New Zealand: The Implications for the 
Formation, Organization and Operations of the Cabinet.” The Australian Quarterly 66(3): 74. 
Coffé, Hilde. 2013. “Gender and party choice at the 2011 New Zealand general election.” 
Political Science 65(1): 25-45. 
19 
 
DigiPoll. 2014. “DigiPoll – Election Polling.” http://www.digipoll.com/library/election-
polling. 
Elff, Martin. 2007. “Social structure and electoral behavior in comparative perspective: the 
decline of social cleavages in Western Europe revisited.” Perspectives on Politics 5(2): 277-
294. 
Fairburn, Miles, and Stephen Haslett. 2005. “The Rise of the Left and Working-Class Voting 
Behavior in New Zealand: New Methods.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 35(4): 523-
555. 
Findlay, Buddle. 2011. “New Zealand’s abortion law – mum’s the word.” The Law Report, 
July 5. http://www.thelawreport.co.nz/news/4041/new-zealand%E2%80%99s-abortion-law-
%E2%80%93-mums-the-word-28-june-2011/. 
Franklin, Mark, Tom Mackie, and Henry Valen, eds. 1992. Electoral change: Responses to 
evolving social and attitudinal structures in Western countries. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gaskins, Ben, Matt Golder, and David A. Siegel. 2013. “Religious participation, social 
conservatism, and human development.” The Journal of Politics 75(4): 1125-1141.   
Gelman, Andrew. 2008. “Scaling regression inputs by dividing by two standard deviations.” 
Statistics in Medicine 27(15): 2865-2873. 
Honey, Rex, and J. Ross Barnett. 1990. “Volatile stability: New Zealand’s 1987 general 
election.” In Developments in Electoral Geography, edited by Ron Johnston, Fred M. 
Shelley, and Peter J. Taylor,  86-99. London: Routledge. 
Hoverd, William James. 2008. “No longer a Christian country? Religious demographic 
change in New Zealand 1966–2006.” New Zealand Sociology 23(1): 41-65. 
Iusitini, Leon, and Charles Crothers. 2013. “Turnout and voting choices at general elections 
of Pacific peoples in New Zealand.” Political Science 65(2): 155-177. 
Jansen, Giedo, Nan Dirk de Graaf, and Ariana Need. 2012. “Explaining the Breakdown of the 
Religion-Vote Relationship in the Netherlands, 1971-2006.” West European Politics 35(4): 
756-783. 
Lachat, Romain. 2007. A Heterogeneous Electorate: Political Sophistication, Predisposition 
Strength, and the Voting Decision Process. Baden-Baden: Nomos.  
Levine, Stephen, and Nigel S. Roberts. 1991. “The New Zealand General Election of 
1990.” Political Science 43(1): 1-19. 
Levine, Stephen, and Nigel S. Roberts. 1994. “The New Zealand General Election and 
Electoral Referendum of 1993.” Political Science 46(1): 40-69. 
20 
 
Levine, Stephen, and Alan Robinson. 1976. The New Zealand Voter: A Survey of Public 
Opinion and Electoral Behaviour, 131-141. Wellington: Price Milburn for New Zealand 
University Press.  
Lindsey, David. 2010. “Conscience Voting: Who Decides?” In New Zealand Government 
and Politics 5th edition, edited by Raymond Miller, 255-268. Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press.  
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: 
Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free press. 
Medeiros, Mike, and Alain Noël. 2013. “The Forgotten Side of Partisanship: Negative Party 
Identification in Four Anglo-American Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 47(7): 
1022-1046. 
Miller, Raymond. 2005. Party Politics in New Zealand. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 
Minkenberg, Michael. 2010. “Party politics, religion and elections in Western democracies.” 
Comparative European Politics 8(4): 385-414.   
“MPs vote 65-55 in favour of Civil Union Bill.” 2004. NZ Herald, December 2. 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=9001414. 
Nagel, Jack. 1994. “How Many Parties will New Zealand Have Under MMP?” Political 
Science 26(2): 139-60. 
“National cuts Labour’s lead in first full poll since tax policy.” 2005. NZ Herald, August 29. 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10342917. 
“Prostitution decriminalised, brothels to be licensed.” 2003. NZ Herald, June 25. 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=3509357. 
Raymond, Christopher D. 2016. “Not all social cleavages are the same: On the relationship 
between religious diversity and party system fragmentation.” Politics and Religion 9(2): 364-
388.  
Rishworth, Paul. 2007. “Changing Times, Changing Minds, Changing Laws – Sexual 
Orientation and New Zealand Law, 1960 to 2005.” The International Journal of Human 
Rights 11(1-2): 85-107. 
Robinson, Alan D. “Class Voting in Zealand: A Comment on Alford's Comparison of Class 
Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems.” In Party Systems and Voter Alignments: 
Cross-National Perspectives, edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 95-114. New 
York: The Free Press. 
Smith, T. Alexander, and Raymond Tatalovich. 2003. Cultures at War: Moral Conflicts in 
Western Democracies. Toronto: Broadview Press. 
21 
 
Vaccarino, Franco, Heather Kavan. and Philip Gendall. 2011. “Spirituality and Religion in 
the Lives of New Zealanders.” Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Society 1(2): 85-96.   
Vowles, Jack, and Peter Aimer. 1993. Voters’ vengeance: the 1990 election in New Zealand 
and the fate of the fourth Labour government. Auckland: Auckland University Press.  
Vowles, Jack. 1998a. “A New Post-MMP Party System?” In Voters’ Victory: New Zealand’s 
First Election Under Proportional Representation, edited by Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, 
Susan Banducci, and Jeffrey Karp. Auckland, Auckland University Press.  
Vowles, Jack. 1998b. “Countdown to MMP.” In Voters’ Victory: New Zealand’s First 
Election Under Proportional Representation, edited by Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan 
Banducci, and Jeffrey Karp. Auckland, Auckland University Press.  
22 
 
Table 1. Logistic Regression Models of Voting for National (1) versus Labour (0) 
 
       Year      
Variables  1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 
Frequent 
Attendance  0.94* 0.49* -0.12 0.19 -0.09 0.62* 0.82* 0.83* 0.40* 
Traditional  0.56* 0.70* 0.66* 0.52* 0.64* 0.32* 0.47* 0.26* 0.36* 
Attendance × Trad. -0.70* -0.09 0.06 -0.27 0.33 -0.44* -0.71* -1.01* -0.68* 
Non-European  -1.02* -0.66* -0.33* -0.76* -1.17* -1.57* -1.28* -1.26* -1.05* 
Union Household 0.10 -0.99* -0.93* -0.92* -1.13* -1.02* -0.81* -1.14* -1.52* 
University Degree -0.26 -0.05 -0.12 -0.24 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.35* 0.08 
Income  0.30* 0.98* 0.50* 0.95* 0.56* 0.95* 0.94* 1.20* 1.08* 
Rural   0.67* 0.36* 0.20 0.58* 0.82* 0.16 0.23* 0.28* 0.32* 
Female  -0.14 -0.26 -0.37* -0.19 -0.37* -0.39* -0.21* -0.02 -0.17 
Age   0.28* -0.13 -0.70* -0.66* -0.16 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.43* 
Constant  -0.12 0.12 0.17 -0.45* -0.82* 0.08 0.23* 0.79* 1.00* 
McFadden’s R2  0.06 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.13 
n    1453 1378 950 1596 1057 2425 2034 1817 1743 





Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Support for the Major Parties in Each Election 
 
               Election      
Party   1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 
National Party Vote 
Share   48% 35% 34% 31% 21% 39% 45% 47% 47% 
Predicted Probabilities1  
National  0.63* 0.30 0.12 0.26 0.09 0.37* 0.60* 0.70* 0.55* 
Labour   0.32 0.29 0.17 0.39 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.15 0.16 
Green   0.02   0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.06 
NewLabour/Alliance/  
Progressive  0.03 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01 - - - 
New Zealand First  0.17 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.08 
ACT     0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 - - 
Māori         0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Mana Movement        - 0.01 
Christian Heritage/ 
Christian Coalition - - 0.52 0.19 - - 
United/United Future   - - 0.43 0.21 0.03 - - 
Conservative         - 0.13 
Entries are the predicted probabilities of voting for each party among voters attending religious services at 
least once per month who do not belong to one of the four denominations that traditionally have supported 
National (all other variables held to their median values).  * indicates that the predicted probability of voting 
for National is significantly greater than the percentage voting for Labour at the 0.05 level (one-tailed tests).  





Figure 1. Proportion of Voters in Each Election Who Attend Religious Services At Least 
Once Per Month 
 
 
Notes: entries are the proportions of voters in each election attending religious services at 
least once per month. The solid black horizontal line represents the median proportion of 



























Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Voting National by Frequency of Attendance 
 
 
Note: the solid black line is the predicted probability of voting for National among voters 
frequently attending religious services (and who do not belong to one of the four 'traditional' 
religions), while the solid grey line is the predicted probability of voting for National among 
voters infrequently/never attending religious services (dashed lines are 90% confidence 




































                                                          
i  While some definitions of ‘cleavage’ require political parties representing social group interests more 
explicitly than is the case with National/Labour regarding religious/secular issues—see Bartolini and Mair 
(1990)—this paper builds on previous research concerned more with the behaviour of religious groups and their 
voters for the appearance of religious cleavages (see Raymond 2016).   
ii  While some research finds evidence of a cleavage between Protestants and Catholics—see, e.g., Medeiros and 
Noël (2013)—other research suggests that Catholics tend to side with Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Methodists 
in supporting National over Labour—see, e.g., Vowles and Aimer (1993, 33-34); Vowles (1998a, 66-67).  
iii  This is not to ignore those studies that have mentioned the religious-secular cleavage: Nagel (1994; Vowles 
(1998a); Miller (2005, 52-63). 
iv  The social conservatism of religious voters can be seen when looking at attitudes towards homosexuality.  
Using the item ‘Homosexual relationships are always wrong’ from the New Zealand Election Studies shows that 
only about 20 percent of frequently attending voters in 1993 had a liberal attitude towards homosexuality 
(defined as those disagreeing with this statement), compared with ~40 percent among never/infrequent 
attenders; while the share of liberal responses increased among never/infrequent attenders in 2008 to ~60 
percent, fewer than 30 percent of frequently attending voters held liberal attitudes. 
v  On these points, see Raymond (2016, 367-369). 
vi Although National may not represent socially conservative religious voters’ issue positions as clearly as many 
of the third parties seeking their votes, some previous research—Jansen, de Graaf, and Need (2012)—showing 
that religious voters’ support for socially conservative parties in the Netherlands was not dampened by 
moderated party positions suggests religious voters may not be put off by National’s less-committed stances.   
vii  The results replacing the party vote-based measure with the electorate vote-based measure provide even 
clearer evidence of a religious-secular cleavage than the results presented here.  The fact the electorate vote-
based measure produces clearer evidence of a religious-secular cleavage suggests religious voters put even more 
pressure on their MPs than the National Party as a whole.   
viii  Respondents were asked the following question: ‘Apart from weddings, funerals, and baptisms, about how 
often if at all do you attend religious services these days?’.   
ix  Results using the full scale to measure frequency of attendance rather than the dummy variable used here 
produce results that are substantively equivalent to those presented here.   
x  Non-attending voters may have supported National in such large numbers due to Prime Minister Key’s 
positions regarding same-sex marriage.  Following the adoption of same-sex marriage, which Key and several 
other National MPs supported, it is possible that the probabilities of voting for National do not differ by 
frequency of attendance because National now appeals to both religious and secular voters.  It remains to be 
seen whether National will be maintain this coalition in future elections or whether secular voters will leave 
National and turn to other, more secular parties.   
xi  While the polls in 2005 showed a tight race between National and Labour, they still predicted National’s 
outcome correctly (e.g., “National cuts Labour’s lead” 2005). 
xii  The difference in the ratio of National:Labour probabilities between the results in Table 2 from 1999 and 
those seen in Figure 2 is due to the difference between the two measures of the dependent variable: the impact 
of attendance on the probability of voting for National is stronger when examining the binary measure than 
when other parties like Christian Heritage are included.   
xiii  See the discussion in note vii.    
